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A Critical Evaluation of the Major Proposals
Troyen A. Brennant
Nearly every major policy initiative in medical care relates to one of three
major themes: cost, quality, or access. Some policy-makers emphasize runaway
costs and seek new methods of restricting expenditures. Others focus on lack
of access to medical care, especially for the uninsured. Another set of con-
cerned individuals advocates methods for providing better quality medical care.
Since these themes are not readily divisible, it is reasonable to pay some
attention to quality in a symposium issue on costs and access.
The group concerned about the quality of medical care is a heterogeneous
collection of professionals, reflecting the variety of approaches for ensuring
quality. Traditionally, quality assurance was the responsibility of the medical
staff of hospitals, and, in particular, of individual physicians. In the last fifteen
years, however, hospital administrators have assumed wider prerogatives, and
notions of institutional improvement now dominate the quality agenda.
Parallel to this internal quality assurance is the external oversight of state
administrators. Their power to improve the quality of medical care remains
largely confined to licensure control. A theoretically much more effective
external quality control is tort law. Yet many-especially providers-have
questioned tort law's deterrent effect and have suggested that defensive medi-
cine, induced by fear of malpractice suits, unnecessarily increases the costs
of medical care. Through tort reform they seek to hinder plaintiff's ability to
sue. Many legislators at both state and federal levels have proven to be sympa-
thetic to calls for limits on tort liability.
Controversy over the best way to improve quality has increased recently.
While access issues dominated the health policy agenda over the last year,'
the optimal structure of quality assurance came in a very close second. In this
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1. The literature on health-care reform is voluminous. A thorough discussion of the major politically
viable approach, employer mandated health insurance coverage, is found in the Pepper Commission Report.
See U.S. BIPARTISAN COMM'N ON COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH CARE (PEPPER COMM'N), A CALL FOR
ACTION: FINAL REPORT OF THE PEPPER COMMISSION (1990). A series of other proposals is found in a
volume of the Journal of the American Medical Association devoted to issues of medical care for the
uninsured and underinsured. See generally Ronald S. Bronow et al., The Physicians Wi Care Plan:
Preserving Quality and Equitability in American Medicine, 265 JAMA 2511 (1991); Donald 0. Nutter et
al., Restructuring Health Care in the United States: A Proposal for the 1990s, 265 JAMA 2516 (1991);
Karen Davis, Expanding Medicare and Employer Plans to Achieve Universal Health Insurance, 265 JAMA
2525 (1991); Alain C. Enthoven & Richard Kronick, Universal Health Insurance Through Incentives
Reform, 265 JAMA 2532 (1991); Kevin Grumbach et al., Liberal Benefits, Conservative Spending: The
Physicians fOr a National Health Program Proposal, 265 JAMA 2549 (1991). A more conservative
approach that emphasizes efficiency is described in Mark V. Pauly et al., A Plan for 'Responsible National
Health Insurance,' 10 HEALTH AFF. 5 (1991).
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essay, I critically review the various proposals for effecting better quality care
and suggest that one-a system of no-fault compensation for medical injuries-
is superior. In addition to ensuring better quality medical care, the no-fault
system would provide more just compensation for medical injuries, and could
be especially effective if integrated with a system of universal access to health
care such as I have advocated elsewhere.2
I. DEFINITIONS AND MEASUREMENTS OF QUALITY
Examining proposals to improve quality is, in many ways, more difficult
than examining access proposals, because "quality of medical care" is less well
defined than "access." Quality seems to comprise at least four different compo-
nents: patient satisfaction, adherence to correct process, an acceptable out-
come, and efficiency of care provided. Although it is possible that satisfied
patients had good outcomes, and that adherence to correct process leads to
efficient care, these concepts are nonetheless statistically and conceptually
independent. Quality in the eyes of one person is not quality in the eyes of
another.
Different definitions of quality give rise to distinct tools for measuring it.'
For instance, the federal government has attempted to measure quality by
focusing on mortality rates among Medicare patients in individual hospitals,
even though many have cautioned that differences in mortality rates among
hospitals may be difficult to interpret4 (notwithstanding adjustments for clinical
characteristics of the institution's case mix).5 A wealth of other measures are
2. See TROYEN A. BRENNAN, JUST DOCTORING: MEDICAL ETHICS IN THE LIBERAL STATE 203-29
(1991).
3. One would expect one quality measure to identify certain cases as quality problems, while another
measure singles out a different set, because each is based on different definitions of quality. See Avedis
Donabedian, The Epidemiology of Quality, 22 INQUIRY 282, 282-83 (1985).
4. See, e.g., Arlene Fink et at., The Condition of the Literature on Differences in Hospital Mortality,
27 MED. CARE 315, 319 (1989).
5. See Robert Dubois et al., Adjusted Hospital Death Rates: A Potential Screening for Quality of
Medical Care, 77 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1162, 1164 (1987). There are numerous increasingly sophisticated
studies of readmission and mortality rates. See, e.g., Stephen F. Jencks et al., Assessing Hospital-Associated
Deaths from Discharge Data: The Role of Length of Stay and Comorbidities, 260 JAMA 2240 (1988);
Sheldon Greenfield et al., Flaws in Mortality Data: The Hazards of Ignoring Comorbid Disease, 260 JAMA
2253 (1988); Fink, supra note 4; Jesse Green et al., The Importance of Severity of Illness in Assessing
Hospital Mortality, 263 JAMA 241 (1990); Donald M. Berwick & David L. Wald, Hospital Leaders'
Opinions of the HCFA Mortality Data, 263 JAMA 247 (1990); Jesse Green et al., Analyzing Hospital
Mortality: The Consequences of Diversity in Patient Mix, 265 JAMA 1849 (1991).
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now in various stages of development.6 Unfortunately, there is little informa-
tion on how the different measures overlap or correlate.7
As noted, the most traditional definition of quality in medicine has been
the prevention of untoward outcomes caused by medical care, so-called
iatrogenic injuries. For the last forty years, physicians on tissue committees
and participants at morbidity and mortality rounds have performed what a
quality expert would refer to as "implicit judgments" about the standard of
care expected of a reasonable practitioner.
Malpractice litigation has been built on the same foundation. The measure
of quality in medical malpractice is compliance with a standard, coupled with
the fact of injury. A successful litigant must show both negligence (failure to
meet a standard) and compensable injury. Thus, in quality vernacular, malprac-
tice is an outcome measure combined with an implicit judgment. This conflu-
ence of traditional medical and legal definitions of quality suggests that injuries
6. The RAND group has compared explicit process of care scales with implicit physician judgments
in their analysis of quality of care before and after the institution of prospective payment. See Katherine
L. Kahn et al., Measuring Quality of Care with Explicit Process Criteria Before and After Implementation
of the DRG-Based Prospective Payment System, 264 JAMA 1969 (1990) [hereinafter Kahn, Measuring
Quality]; Katherine L. Kahn et al., Comparing Outcomes of Care Before and After Implementation of the
DRG-Based Prospective Payment System, 264 JAMA 1984 (1990). Others have used changes in severity
of illness, employing Computerized Severity Index (CSI) and Medisgroups, to assess quality of care for
myocardial infarction and coronary artery bypass grafting. See Lisa I. lezzoni et al., The Utility of Severity
of Illness Information in Assessing the Quality of Hospital Care: The Role of the Clinical Trajectory, 30
MED. CARE (forthcoming 1992). Another approach has been to assess patients' judgments of the care they
received as a measure of quality. See Paul D. Cleary et al., Patients Report About Their Hospital Care:
A National Study (Jan. 3, 1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Yale Law & Policy Review);
Mark Meterko & Haya R. Rubin, Patient Judgments of Hospital Quality: A Taxonomy, 28 MED. CARE
S10 (Supp. 1990). Still others have combined some outcome measures as indicators with implicit reviews
to identify preventable adverse events. See Troyen A. Brennan et al., Incidence of Adverse Events and
Negligence in Hospitalized Patients: Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study 1, 324 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 370 (1991).
7. The perception that quality measures should be examined and compared is not new. Indeed, it has
been twenty years since Robert Brook undertook what is still the broadest comparison of different methods
of measuring quality. Robert H. Brook & Francis A. Appel, Quality-of-Care Assessment: Choosing a
Methodfor PeerReview, 288 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1323 (1973). The opening paragraph of that paper reflects
the background for and significance of this research effort: "Increasing public pressure and recent
Congressional legislation have focused attention on the need for developing a formal mechanism ... to
assess the quality of medical care. The success of this effort, however, depends on the answers to two
fundamental questions: whether information describing physician performance (process) or the results of
care (outcome), or both, should be collected and analyzed; and how and by whom value judgments should
be placed on these data to determine the quality of care provided." Id. at 1323 (footnote omitted).
In that study, Brook evaluated process and outcome measures, based on both implicit and explicit
reviews. Since then, the RAND group headed by Brook has ventured into multiple comparisons of quality
measures. Specifically, they have used explicit and implicit measures of the process of care, and compared
these to mortality rates, finding substantial concurrence in four prevalent diagnoses. See Kahn, Measuring
Quality, supra note 6. Judith Hall has reported on the relationship between functional status and satisfaction.
See Judith A. Hall et al., Older Patients Health Status and Satisfaction with Medical Care in an HMO
Population, 28 MED. CARE 261 (1990).
These reports, however, are not designed to provide certain information that hospitals might find
important as they select from the growing list of process and outcome variables. Cost data, for example,
is not provided, and we still do not know how some major quality measures compare in terms of the kinds
of cases they identify as poor quality, the overall preventability of the quality problems isolated, and the
costs of implementation.
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caused by failure to adhere to standard care form an important aspect of
quality. Of course in some cases, especially those involving a failure to
diagnose, the negligence judgment is not conceptually severable from that of
causation. Nonetheless, the determination of negligence and the identification
of causation by medical management are integral to the traditional notion of
quality.
Recent data suggests that insofar as quality of medical care is defined as
negligent injury, there is a great deal of room for improvement. I have worked
with a team of investigators to evaluate a random sample of over 30,000 cases
of medical care. We used conventional, health-services research methodology
to estimate the number of adverse events,8 and the percentage of all adverse
events, caused by negligent or substandard care in New York hospitals in
1984. 9 We calculated that among the 2.6 million hospital discharges in New
York in 1984, there were 89,200 adverse events. Of these, 56,000 gave rise
to minimal impairment from which individuals recovered within one month,
while another 13,500 led to moderate impairment but with recovery in less
than six months. Therefore more than 70% of adverse events led to short-term
disability. On the other hand, there were large numbers of individuals who
suffered more serious injuries. Thirty-eight hundred adverse events produced
permanent, partial impairment. More than 2,500 individuals incurred perma-
nent total disabilities as a result of adverse events. Finally, 13,400 adverse
events caused death. Overall, negligence caused 28% of adverse events. The
proportion of negligent adverse events increased with severity of injury. Thus,
there were nearly 7,000 deaths due to negligence.
These numbers are quite striking, particularly the fatality rate attributable
8. Adverse events are defined as injuries prolonging the hospital stay, or causing disability at the time
of discharge, that were caused by medical management as opposed to the disease process.
9. We also compared the results of our hospital record analysis to a comprehensive analysis of all
litigation records from New York medical professional liability insurers, surveyed injured individuals as
well as uninjured controls to understand the costs of injury suffered by patients, and used econometric
methods to assess the deterrent effect of tort litigation. Much of this research has now been published in
medical journals. See Troyen A. Brennan et al., Reliability and Validity of Judgments Concerning Adverse
Events Suffered by Hospitalized Patients, 27 MED. CARE 1148 (1989) [hereinafter Brennan, Reliability and
Validity]; Troyen A. Brennan et al., Identification of Adverse Events Occurring During Hospitalization:
A Cross-Sectional Study of Litigation, Quality Assurance, and Medical Records at Two Teaching Hospitals,
112 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 221 (1990); Troyen A. Brennan et al., Incidence of Adverse Events and
Negligent Care in Hospitalized Patients, 324 NEw ENG. J. MED. 370 (1991) [hereinafter Brennan,
Incidence of Adverse Events]; Lucian L. Leape et al., The Nature of Adverse Events in Hospitalized
Patients, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 377 (1991); Troyen A. Brennan et al., Hospital Characteristics
Associated with Adverse Events and Substandard Care, 265 JAMA 3265 (1991); A. Russell Localio et al.,
Relation Between Medical Malpractice Claims and Adverse Events Due to Negligence, 325 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 245 (1991); Ann G. Lawthers et al., Physician Perceptions of the Risk of Being Sued, 17 J. HEALTH
POL. POL'Y & L. (forthcoming 1992); William Johnson et al., The Economic Consequences of Medical
Injuries: Implications for a No-Fault Insurance Plan, 267 JAMA (forthcoming May 1992). Much of this
information is summarized in Troyen A. Brennan, An Empirical Analysis of Accidents and Accident Law:
The Case of Medical Malpractice Law, 36 ST. Louis U. L.J. (forthcoming 1992) [hereinafter Brennan,
Empirical Analysis of Accidents].
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to negligence. Extrapolating the adverse event-related death total to the United
States at large, we estimate there are 180,000 iatrogenic deaths annually. Over
90,000 of these are due to negligence. Moreover, the permanent total disabili-
ties represent 3 % of the overall, adverse-event total. This works out to approx-
imately 35,000 permanently disabled individuals on a national basis. These
cases represent enormous personal suffering as well as huge costs for social
benefit programs. Thus, the burden of morbidity and mortality from poor
quality medical care represents a significant public health problem.
In summary, the measure of injuries caused by substandard care indicates
that poor quality care pervades our current system. This degree of substandard
care compels an examination of proposals for improving the quality of care.
While doing so, we should not forget the other important parameters in the
health policy debate: cost containment, justice, and access.
II. EXISTING METHODS FOR ASSESSING QUALITY
The foregoing discussion provides us with a lens for studying proposals
to improve medical care and for judging the overall "fit" of these proposals
with universal access. Before doing so, this section will review contemporary
quality-assurance practices. Current methods of ensuring and improving the
quality of care can be placed in one of three categories: provider initiatives,
regulation, and tort law.'°
Providers still undertake their own forms of self-policing to ensure high-
quality care for patients. Foremost among these are ethical standards calling
for altruistic attention to the patient's medical needs. Part of this attention
consists of ongoing commitment to high-quality medical care." Indeed, most
physicians would submit that it is their own sense of ethics, rather than some
set of outside influences, that provides the primary motivation for maintaining
a high standard of care.' 2
More formal quality assurance efforts have been assumed by hospitals and
their medical staffs.' 3 For example, hospitals have had strict controls on
10. Here we leave aside the possibility that a market in health care would bring about competition
based on quality. See infra part VI.
11. Lynn M. Peterson & Troyen Brennan, Medical Ethics and Medical Injuries: Taking Our Duties
Seriously, 1 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 207 (1991).
12. When thinking about quality, most providers chiefly consider medical injury prevention, although
ratings of patient satisfaction also play a role.
13. Quality assurance, including assessment of iatrogenic injuries, has been a primary duty of medical
staffs since the structure of modern hospitals developed in the early part of this century. First the Hospital
Standardization Program of the American College of Surgeons, and then the Joint Commission for
Accreditation of Hospitals, insisted that medical staffs review records and ensure that a high standard of
care was rendered. Timothy S. Jost, The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals: Private
Regulation of Health Care and the Public Interest, 24 B.C. L. REV. 835, 847 (1983).
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record-keeping for a long time. In conjunction with the medical staff, hospitals
have maintained tissue committees and morbidity/mortality conferences where
physicians have been able to engage in self-criticism.1 4 The medical staff
promotes quality care by policing itself through credentialing committees that
control membership.'" We know little about the efficacy of such programs,
although there is some evidence that hospitals that support such committees
have fewer malpractice claims, and presumably cause fewer medical
injuries. "
As noted above, interest in quality assurance and improvement in health
care has re-emerged, leading to the development of several new quality tools.
The reasons for this renewed effort are not entirely clear, but it may be
motivated by a perception on the part of health-care organizations that they will
one day have to compete on the basis of the quality of care they render. New
philosophies of quality improvement also have developed, many centering on
industrial models of quality enhancement.1 7 This Total Quality Management
(TQM) movement emphasizes an understanding of the hospital as a complex
institution critical to improving care. It appeals largely to hospital administra-
tors and has offered little to the individual practicing physician. Those organi-
zations that most successfully have employed TQM are integrated health-care
management organizations, in which a central authority exercises control over
the entire range of health-care institutions, from doctors' offices to hospitals,
and to long term care. 8 Nonetheless, TQM is in its infancy, and as yet there
are no studies of its efficacy.
Since the provider-initiated forms of quality assurance offer so little
opportunity for consumer appraisal, it is not surprising that most of the atten-
tion of lawyers and policymakers focuses on regulation and torts.' 9 Regulation
14. For an excellent sociological analysis of the imperial world of quality assurance on a surgical staff,
see CHARLES L. BOSK, FORGIVE AND REMEMBER (1979). Again, the emphasis is on prevention of medical
injury.
15. Self-policing has often had antitrust implications. See, e.g., Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94 (1988).
16. See Laura L. Morlock & Faye E. Malitz, Do Hospital Risk Management Programs Make a
Difference?: Relationships Between Risk Management Program Activities and Hospital Malpractice Claims
Experience, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1991, at 1. See also Orley H. Lindgren et al., Medical
Malpractice Risk Management Early Warning Systems, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1991, at 24.
17. Building on insights developed in quality improvement by large organizations, some physicians
have argued that the best way to bring about better care in hospitals is to shift the focus of quality assurance
efforts from physician mistakes to system failures. See Donald M. Berwick, Continuous Improvement as
an Ideal in Health Care, 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 53 (1989); Glenn Laffel & David Blumenthal, The Case
for Using Industrial Quality Management Science in Health Care Organizations, 262 JAMA 2869 (1989).
18. For instance, much of the intellectual activity regarding total quality management has been
generated at the Harvard Community Health Plan, in particular by Don Berwick. The Harvard Community
Health Plan is an integrated staff model health maintenance organization. All physicians and nurse
practitioners are full-time employees. The various health centers refer all their patients to a single hospital.
19. Patient inability to judge the quality of sophisticated medical care has led to the distinction between
technical quality and functional quality, the latter being the set of parameters that the patients relies upon
when assessing care. See Emin Babakus & W. Glynn Mangold, Adapting the SERVQUAL Scale to Hospital
Services: An Empirical Investigation, 26 HEALTH SERVICES REs. 767 (1992).
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itself is rather underdeveloped. The earliest form, the Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH), was actually an outgrowth of provider self-
regulation.20 While states historically have licensed practitioners, only recent-
ly have concerns about quality become part of the licensing procedure. 2t
Since about 1975, states have tried to exercise more thorough review of
hospital care,22 but recently these efforts have been hampered by yawning
budget deficits.'
The federal government slowly has come to exercise some oversight of
medical care under the federal reimbursement programs, especially Medi-
care. 24 First under the Professional Standard Review Organizations and now
through the Peer Review Organizations (PROs), the Health Care Financing
Administration is supposed to identify substandard care provided to beneficia-
ries." Unfortunately, some PROS have been badly administered26 and their
evaluations of care shown to correlate very poorly with more accepted ap-
proaches.27
Given these alternatives, it should be clear why tort law casts a long
shadow in medical care. The successful litigant sends one of the few signals
heard by practitioners regarding the quality of care. Under a general theory
of deterrence,28 the successful plaintiff's economic award should reduce
health-care providers' accident-causing behavior in the future. While the
20. See Jost, supra note 13, at 847-52. It is notable that there is little correlation between the quality
of measures completed by the JCAH and other measures of quality. See Helen R. Burstin et al., Correla-
tions Between Different Measures of Hospital Quality, 40 CLINICAL RES. 578A (1992) (abstract)..
21. See Kansas State Bd. of Healing Arts v. Foote, 436 P.2d 828, 834 (Kan. 1968) (finding that
physician competence should be an issue in licensing).
22. For instance in 1986, Massachusetts passed sweeping legislation requiring hospitals to report cases
of physician discipline. Hospitals' challenges to this legislation were largely unsuccessful. See, e.g., Beth
Israel Hosp. Ass'n. v. Board of Registration, 515 N.E.2d 574 (Mass. 1987).
23. Public Citizen, a health advocacy group in Washington, has monitored the number of disciplinary
proceedings undertaken by licensing authorities in all fifty states over the past decade. In 1983 state
licensing boards reported only 563 seriousdisciplinary actions taken against physicians in the United States,
amounting to an average of 1.5 disciplinary actions per 1,000 physicians. See SIDNEY WOLFE ET AL.,
PUBLIC CITIZEN, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THE NEED FOR DISCIPLINARY REFORM, NOT TORT REFORM
1 (1985). While there were increases in the number of proceedings in a variety of states in the mid 1980s,
overall it appears that the numbers are now slipping. Experts believe that this is due to lack of funding for
state regulators. Telephone Interview with Sidney Wolfe, Director, Public Citizen Research Group (Jan.
12, 1992). See also Richard Saltus, Doctor-review Panel is 46th in US Ranking, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr.
23, 1992, at 29.
24. One of the legislative compromises that gave rise to Medicare was the result of an American
Medical Association demand that Medicare not be granted broad oversight responsibilities. See David
Blumenthal, Medicare: The Beginnings, in RENEWING THE PROMISE: MEDICARE AND ITS REFORM 3, 8
(David Blumenthal et al. eds., 1988).
25. Clark C. Havighurst & James F. Blumstein, Coping with Quality/Cost Trade-offs in Medical Care:
The Role of PSROs, 70 Nw. U. L. REV. 6, 8 (1975).
26. For example, the Health Care Financing Administration just cancelled its contract with the major
Peer Review Organization in Florida. See Feds End Contract with Florida PRO, AM. MED. NEWS, Jan.
15, 1992, at 1.
27. See Haya Rubin et al., An Evaluation of Peer Review Organization Judgments About Quality of
Care, 267 JAMA (forthcoming May 1992).
28. GutDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 244 (1970).
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economic aspect of the signal is greatly muted by the flat nature of professional
liability insurance,29 some argue that malpractice litigation generates enough
psychological deterrence to produce a change in physician behavior.3 °
Our group of investigators recently has subjected the deterrence theory of
malpractice litigation to a relatively rigorous empirical assessment.3' We
found that, while large numbers of medical injuries occur in American hospi-
tals, surprisingly few of these give rise to litigation. In fact, there are approxi-
mately seven to eight times as many injuries as claims for medical injuries.
In addition, many claims arise in cases where there is no medical injury. We
concluded that as few as 2% of negligent medical injuries give rise to litiga-
tion, while as many as 80% of claims arise in cases in which no injury or
negligence exists.
This information suggests that confidence in tort litigation as a method of
improving quality is misplaced. Indeed, it is difficult to detect a deterrent effect
associated with the haphazard functioning of malpractice litigation. While
survey data suggests that physicians believe they are at a substantial risk of
being sued,32 the safety induced by higher rates of litigation cannot be ascer-
tained. We performed econometric analyses comparing litigation rates and
injury rates between regions in New York, hoping to uncover some evidence
of the deterrent effect of litigation. We could not find evidence that supported
our hypothesis that there should be fewer injuries in areas where there was
more tort litigation.33 Therefore, tort law's role as a quality-inducing device
is somewhat suspect. 4
Given the incidence of medical injuries noted above, the currently available
means of inducing quality in medical care must be ineffective. No doubt this
can be at least partially explained by our general societal acceptance of the
medical profession's request that we trust them to provide decent care.35
Another explanation may be that government and consumers lack the will to
overcome a powerful profession's assertion of self-regulation. In any case, as
we prepare to remake the financing of American health care (in part, it is
presumed, to provide high quality care to all Americans, not just those with
29. See Frank A. Sloan & Mahmud Hassan, Equity and Accuracy in Medical Malpractice Insurance
Pricing, 9 J. HEALTH ECON. 289, 290 (1990).
30. See Peter A. Bell, Legislative Intrusions into the Commnon Law of Medical Malpractice: Thoughts
About the Deterrent Effect of Tort Liability, 35 SYRACUSE L. REV. 939, 966 (1984).
31. See Brennan, Empirical Analysis of Accidents, supra note 9.
32. Lawthers et al., supra note 9.
33. See Kenneth E. Thorpe et al., Does the Threat of a Lawsuit Affect the Frequency of Malpractice?
(Nov. 30, 1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Yale Law & Policy Review).
34. I have said little about the tort compensation function. I will return to this subject later in the essay.
See infra text accompanying notes 67-70.
35. See BRENNAN, supra note 2, at 97-120.
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insurance), we should carefully study the available proposals for bringing about
better quality medical care. 6
As the foregoing would suggest, relatively few generic alternatives for
improving the quality of care exist. We could remind doctors and other
providers of their ethical duties to provide optimal care for patients." Another
approach would be to bolster regulatory oversight both at the state and federal
level.38 By and large, however, reform proposals tend to emphasize changes
in tort law as the best means for improving the quality of care. These should
be explored in more detail.
III. TRADITIONAL TORT REFORM
Tort reform generally refers to changes in tort doctrine that have been
undertaken by legislators. These changes are meant to correct the "mistakes"
of common law courts. In reality, tort reform almost always modifies tort law
so that plaintiffs are less likely to sue, and is undertaken at the behest of
chronic defendants, especially physicians concerned about malpractice litigation
and manufacturers upset by product liability. Such reform is especially strin-
gent during periods when claims rates appear to be increasing at unparalleled
36. In 1991, there were twelve bills concerning quality improvement and medical liability reform
pending in the First Session of the 102d United States Congress. They included the following: S. 489-
Ensuring Access Through Medical Liability Reform Act of 1991, introduced by Senator Orrin Hatch on
February 26, 1991; H.R. 1004-Ensuring Access Through Medical Liability Reform Actof 1991, introduced
by Representative Nancy Johnson on February 20, 1991; S. 815-Community and Migrant Health Centers
Self-Insurance Act of 1991, introduced by Senator Hank Brown on April 11, 1991; S. 314-Comprehensive
Health Care Act of 1991, introduced by Senator William Cohen on January 31, 1991; S. 1232-Medical
Injury Compensation Fairness Act of 1991, introduced by Senator Pete Domenici on June 6, 1991; S. 1123-
Health Care Liability Reform and Quality of Care Improvement Act of 1991, introduced by Senator Orrin
Hatch at the request of the President on May 16, 1991; S. 1836-American Health Quality Act, introduced
by Senator Dave Durenberger on October 17, 1991; H.R. 3516-Medical Care Injury Compensation Reform
Act of 1991, introduced by Representative John Kyl on October 8, 1991; H.R. 3591-Federally Supported
Health Care Assistance Act of 1991, introduced by Representative Ron Wyden on October 21, 1991; H.R.
3089-Access to Obstetrical Care Act of 1991, introduced by Representative Michael Bilirakis on July 30,
1991; H.R. 2229-Rural Access to Obstetrical Care Act of 1991, introduced by Representative J. Roy
Rowland on May 7, 1991; H.R. 3037-Health Care Liability Reform and Quality of Care Improvement Act
of 1991, introduced by Representative Bill Archer on July 25, 1991. These are all described in AMERICAN
MED. ASS'N, MEDICAL LIABILrrY REFORM: 102ND CONGRESS - FIRST SESSION (1992) [hereinafter AMA
REFORM SUMMARY].
37. BRENNAN, supra note 2, at 121-46.
38. Several of the bills currently being considered by Congress would attempt to increase patient
protection through disciplinary reforms. For instance, under S. 489, in order to receive Public Health
Service Act funds states would be required to certify that risk management programs had been established
and that they had significant ongoing peer review. Similar oversight would be required under S. 1123/H.R.
3037. Specifically, state health authorities would be required to collect data both on disciplinary actions
and on the use of continuing medical education. Under S. 1836, to receive enhanced Medicaid bonus
payments, states would be required to gather data on health-care injury prevention programs. Again, states
would be required to assure that fees paid by professionals seeking licenses were designated for use by
the agency undertaking disciplinary action in a particular state. See AMA REFORM SUMMARY, supra note
36, at 34.
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rates, such as in the malpractice crisis of the mid-1970s and the general tort
crisis of the mid-1980s.39
Increased claims rates are generally laid at the foot of judges, who are said
to have increased tort litigation inappropriately by lifting doctrinal burdens
from plaintiffs, and in many cases, shifting them to defendants. In medical
malpractice litigation,' ° changes in the locality rule,4' use of the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur, 42 the move from battery to negligence in informed con-
sent43, the loss of the charitable immunity defense," and the use of notions
of corporate liability4' have all been cited as reasons for the increasing suc-
cess of injured patients' suits over the last twenty years.
Tort reform, then, merely re-levels the playing field to protect defendants.
There are two generic approaches.' Both tend to apply pressure on the most
sensitive area of the tort process: the checkbook of the plaintiff's attorney. By
making it more costly to bring suits, and by diminishing the payoff, the
plaintiffs attorney must set a higher threshold for bringing a case.4 7 The
result is that fewer suits are filed.
The first generic approach makes the path to trial longer, or blocks it
altogether. Shortened statutes of limitations,48 the use of screening panels
39. The notion of tort crises and the need for tort reform has been carefully analyzed by George Priest.
Priest argues persuasively that judges, following the advice of academics, have tried to re-knit the tattered
social welfare safety net by creating third-party insurance through torts. Changes in strict liability, and
concepts of enterprise liability, have been the major vehicles for this increase in tort awards. See generally
George L. Priest, Understanding the Liability Crisis, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN LIABILITY LAW, at 196
(Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science Vol. 37, No. 1, 1988). See also George L. Priest, The
Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modem Tort Law,
14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985).
40. Here I follow arguments previously outlined in Paul Weiler & Troyen A. Brennan, Medical
Malpractice, in U.S. BIPARTISAN COMM'N ON COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH CARE (PEPPER COMM'N), A CALL
FOR ACTION: FINAL REPORT OF THE PEPPER COMMISSION 43 (Supp. 1990), and in PAUL C. WEILER,
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL (1991).
41. See, e.g., Brune v. Belinkoff, 235 N.E.2d 793 (Mass. 1968) (reviewing history of locality rule
and holding that doctors should be judged by their compliance to nationwide standards, not local standards).
42. See, e.g., Ybarra v. Spangard, 154 P.2d 687 (Cal. 1944) (holding that res ipsa loquitur applies
when an accident ordinarily does not occur in absence of negligence and is caused by something within
exclusive control of defendant); Quintal v. Laurel Grove Hosp., 397 P.2d 161 (Cal. 1964) (combining res
ipsa loquitur with expert testimony).
43. See, e.g., BRENNAN, supra note 2, at 100-11.
44. See, e.g., Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957) (eliminating charitable immunity for New
York hospitals when patients are injured by hospital employees acting within scope of their employment).
45. See Insinga v. LaBella, 543 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1989) (holding that corporate negligence doctrine
imposes duty on hospitals to select and retain competent physicians, even if they are independent practitio-
ners).
46. See Weiler & Brennan, supra note 40, at 48.
47. A more direct approach is to restore the doctrines that were previously in place. See, e.g.,
WEILER, supra note 40, at 30 (describing efforts to limit doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and to reinstate
locality rule).
48. See, e.g., David A. Sonenshein, A Discovery Rule in Medical Malpractice: Massachusetts Joins
the Fold, 3 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 433, 444 (1981).
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composed of providers and others,49 and modifications of attorney fees all
accomplish this end. The second method limits damages available to successful
plaintiffs. Instead of paying lump sums, which provide a quick payoff for
plaintiffs' attorneys, legislators increasingly require periodic payments of
damages.50 Some legislatures have overturned the collateral source rule and
now require mandatory offsets.5 Finally, many states limit noneconomic
damages, and a few restrict economic damages as well.52 These tort reform
methods have been studied carefully; it is clear that limiting access to the
courts decreases the claims rates, and that changes in damage rules decrease
claims rates significantly.53
The Congressional sponsors of tort-reform legislation have paid attention
to the empirical studies. They typically have endorsed periodic payment for
future damage awards greater than $100,000;"4 mandatory collateral source
offsets;55 caps on noneconomic damages of greater than $250,000;"6 limits
on contingent attorney fees;57 and restrictions on statutes of limitations."They also support several liability in place of joint and several.59 States
49. Stephen Shmanske & Tina Stevens, The Performance of Medical Malpractice Review Panels, 11
J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 525 (1986).
50. See, e.g., Roger C. Henderson, Designing a Responsible Periodic Payment System for Tort
Awards: Arizona Enacts a Prototype, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 21, 27 (1990). Plaintiffs attorneys often try to
avoid periodic payment by indicating in settlement discussions that the use of periodic payment will result
in long-term liens against the estate of physicians.
51. For a general discussion see John G. Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Loss Allocation
in Tort Law, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1478 (1966).
52. The most severe set of restrictions on economic damages exist in Indiana. See William P. Gronfein
& Eleanor D. Kinney, Controlling Large Malpractice Claims: The Unexpected Impact of Damage Caps,
16 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 441, 441-49 (1991).
53. See Frank Sloan et a]., Effects of Tort Reforms on the Value of Closed Medical Malpractice Claims:
A Microanalysis, 14 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 663 (1989); see also WEILER, supra note 40, at 34-36.
54. S. 489, H.R. 1004, S. 1123, H.R. 3037, S. 1836, H.R. 3516, H.R. 3410 and S. 1936 all require
periodic payment for awards for future losses or expenses of greater than $100,000. See AMA REFORM
SUMMARY, supra note 36, at 21-22.
55. S. 489, S. 1123, S. 1836, S. 1936, H.R. 1004, H.R. 3037, H.R. 3516, and H.R. 3410 all require
mandatory collateral source offsets. Id. at 25-26.
56. S. 489, S. 1123, S. 1836, S. 1936, H.R. 1004, H.R. 3037, H.R. 3516, and H.R. 3410 all set
forth $250,000 caps on noneconomic damages. None requires a cap on economic damages. Id. at 23-24.
57. Limits on contingent attorney fees are more variable. S. 489 and H.R. 1004 allow 33% as a
contingent fee on the first $100,000, 15% on the second $100,000 and 10% thereafter. S.1836 allows only
a 25% contingent fee on the first $150,000 and 15% on all awards thereafter. H.R. 3410 allows 40%
contingent fee for the first $500,000, 33% contingent fee on the next $50,000, 25% on the next $100,000
and 10% thereafter. S. 1936 follows the same approach as S. 1836: 25% for the first $150,000 and 15%
thereafter. Id. at 27-28.
58. The restrictions on statutes of limitations also vary somewhat. Most of the bills provide for a two-
year statute of limitations with a four-year statute of repose. A statute of repose restricts use of the
discovery rule to four years. For children, the bills make an exception to the four-year statute of repose,
but require that any actions be brought before the child is eight, or otherwise conform with the statute
requirements. H.R. 3516, on the other hand, requires a two-year statute of limitation with no statute of
repose. H.R. 3410 rules out any use of a discovery rule and provides that, in cases involving children,
the relevant statute of limitations begins running when the child turns six years old. Id. at 29-31.
59. All of these reform measures require that the joint and several liability proportionately be converted
to several liability so that litigants are only liable for the proportional fault they cause. Id. at-31-32.
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undertaking such reforms can expect certain federal supports that noncompliant
states will have to forego.60
The Bush administration and Republican Congressional commitment to tort
reform is impressive. It suggests that they perceive the major health problem
in this country to be the disturbances induced by malpractice litigation. In
particular, they cite the enormous costs of defensive medicine and the lack of
access-especially to obstetrics services in low-income areas-induced by
providers' fear of litigation. These disturbances of the tort system, however,
are poorly documented and hardly withstand serious scrutiny as the major
ailments of the health-care delivery system.
Estimates of the costs of defensive medicine vary widely, largely because
"defensive medicine" itself is hard to define.6' Providers attest that defensive
medicine occurs and is debilitating. Providers loath tort litigation, however,
and therefore one must discount their responses (the more expensive they make
defensive medicine sound, the more pressure there is for tort reform).62 Since
it is nearly impossible to distinguish appropriately conservative care from
defensive medicine, and because many purportedly defensive practices are
nonetheless lucrative for providers, a careful study of the issue is extremely
difficult.63 Any estimates, then, especially those influenced by someone's
political agenda, must be viewed with suspicion."
The argument that access problems result from malpractice litigation is
even less convincing. It has long been suggested that poor patients sue more
often than others, and that many practitioners, particularly obstetricians, are
driven out of impoverished areas by frequent suits .65 The available empirical
evidence refutes these propositions. It is now clear that Medicaid recipients,
for instance, sue no more frequently than other patients.66 More importantly,
60. The Bush Administration's bill, S. 1123-H.R. 3037, The Health Care Liability Reform and Quality
of Care Improvement Act of 1991, is most explicit in tying tort reforms to incentives. States will have three
years to comply with tort reforms. The administration will withhold 1% of Medicare hospital reimburse-
ments and 2% of the federal portion of Medicaid funding which will then be distributed to hospitals in states
where the reforms have been implemented and approved by the Secretary of the Department of Health and
Human Services. Id. at 6.
61. See BRENNAN, supra note 2, at 135-37.
62. Cf Lawthers et al., supra note 9 (documenting extent to which physicians overestimate risk of
malpractice litigation).
63. See Laurence R. Tancredi & Jeremiah A. Barondess, The Problem of Defensive Medicine, 200
SCIENCE 879 (1978) (questioning ability to estimate incidence and costs of defensive medicine).
64. But see Roger Reynolds et al., The Cost of Medical Professional Liability, 257 JAMA 2776 (1987)
(providing best available evidence of significant costs of defensive medicine).
65. See generally DIVISION OF HEALTH PROMOTION AND DISEASE PREVENTION, INST. OF MEDICINE,
MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY AND THE DELIVERY OF OBSTETRICAL CARE (1989).
66. See Mary G. Mussman et al., Medical Malpractice Claims Filed by Medicaid and non-Medicaid
Recipients in Maryland, 265 JAMA 2992 (1991).
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recent research clearly demonstrates that poor patients are less likely than other
patients to bring suit."'
Other empirical evidence, alluded to above, further undermines the federal
push to tort reform. Research from New York suggests that fewer than 2%
of negligently injured individuals file claims.6 This means that a substantial
burden of injury costs are borne by people who theoretically could bring
claims. Tort reform will only increase the number of uncompensated victims.
More importantly, the same research provides the basis for estimates that
negligence causes 100,000 deaths and 15,000 permanent, total disabilities in
American hospitals each year.69 In light of these statistics, tort reform cannot
be considered a responsible reform option, unless one is willing to discount
completely the deterrent effect of malpractice litigation.7" Such reform cer-
tainly has little in common with the communitarian sentiments that underlie
the recent urge to provide universal coverage.
Proponents of traditional tort reform could base their argument on a cost-
containment rationale. If claims rates drop, then malpractice premiums should
decrease and, accordingly, the rise in medical costs will moderate. Unfortu-
nately, this can have only a small effect on cost containment because malprac-
tice expenditures constitute only 1-2% of total health-care costs.7 ' Moreover,
while premiums have leveled off, and even decreased, over the past three
years, health-care inflation continues unabated.72
On the other hand, a public choice model may explain much of the tort
reform legislation. Insofar as it promises decreased health-care costs, by
supposedly lowering the incidence of defensive medicine, tort reform may
appeal to third-party payers. Since it will reduce the number of suits, it appeals
greatly to providers, especially physicians and their insurers. Malpractice
reform may also shift attention from payer reform, a strategy that the Bush
Administration may espouse as it calculates the costs of universal coverage.
Thus, while tort reform can only decrease the quality of care (so long as there
is any deterrent effect associated with litigation) and certainly leaves many
individuals uncompensated for the costs of negligent injury, it may nonetheless
be politically viable.
67. Helen R. Burstin et al., Malpractice Claims and Socioeconomic Status: A Case Control Study,
40 CLINICAL REs. 578A (1992) (abstract). A more reasonable argument to explain problems with access
for poor pregnant women is that reimbursement rates under Medicaid are viewed by many physicians as
insufficient.
68. See Localio et al., supra note 9, at 247-48.
69. See Brennan, Incidence of Adverse Events, supra note 9.
70. While our measurements have failed to detect a significant effect of tort litigation, it seems unwise
to limit its possible deterrent effects without some replacement. Traditional tort reform could only reduce
the deterrent effect of malpractice litigation.
71. See WEILER, supra note 40, at 4.
72. See Katharine R. Levit et al., National Health Expenditures, 1990, 13 HEALTH CARE FiNANCINO
REV. 29, 47 (1991).
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IV. DISPUTE RESOLUTION
In addition to supporting traditional tort reform, many Congressional
proposals advance alternative dispute resolution (ADR) techniques for dispos-
ing of injury claims by patients.73 Advocates of ADR are motivated primarily
by the extensive administrative costs of malpractice litigation. " They reason
that an approach based on arbitration or other forms of negotiation would be
more efficient.75 ADR could also increase access to legal services, as lower
administrative costs translate into lower contingency fees and perhaps lower
thresholds for taking cases.76 In addition, ADR techniques are thought to
promise more expedient determinations for damages77 and perhaps more
equitable and predictable decisions.78 While there is little empirical evidence
supporting ADR,79 there nonetheless is momentum in favor of at least some
dispute resolution devices.'s
The term alternative dispute resolution encompasses a large number of
devices for settling claims.8' In the malpractice field, however, commentators
73. For example S. 489 and H.R. 1004 call for experimentation with alternative dispute resolution
(ADR) systems, either voluntary or mandatory. S. 1123 and H.R. 3037 encourage the adoption of
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. In order to receive all of their Medicare/Medicaid funds, states
will have to establish at least one ADR mechanism that is approved by the Secretary of Health and Human
Services. H.R. 3516, H.R. 3410, and S. 1936 have less specific requirements regarding promotion of ADR.
See AMA REFORM SUMMARY, supra note 36, at 5-6.
74. See, e.g., Deborah Hensler, Trends in Tort Litigation: Findings from the Institutefor Civil Justice
Research, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 478, 492 (1987) (detailing'that tort litigation has administrative costs of greater
than 50%); Jeffrey O'Connell, An Alternative to Tort Liability: ElectiveNo-Fault insurancefor Many Kinds
of Injuries, 60 MINN. L. REV. 501, 503-09 (1976) (identifying administrative costs associated with tort
liability).
75. See. e.g., Catherine Meschievitz, Mediation and Medical Malpractice: Problems ofDefinition and
Implementation, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1991, at 195, 196.
76. See Clark Havighurst & Thomas Metzloff, S. 1232-A Late Entry in the Race for Malpractice
Reform, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1991, at 179, 185-86.
77. Meschievitz, supra note 75, at 196-197.
78. See generally Rhoda M. Powsner & Frances Hamermesh, Medical Malpractice Crisis the Second
Time Around, Why Not Arbitrate?, 8 J. LEGAL MED. 283, 289 (1987); Neil D. Schor, Note, Health Care
Providers and Alternate Dispute Resolution: Needed Medicine to Combat Medical Malpractice Claims, 4
OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 65 (1988).
79. See, e.g., Patricia M. Danzon, The Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims: New
Evidence, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 57, 77-78. Theoretical concerns have been raised
as well. See, e.g., Nicolas P. Terry, The Technical and Conceptual Flaws of Medical Malpractice
Arbitration, 30 ST. Louis U. L.J. 571 (1986).
80. The momentum is evidenced by the proposed federal legislation encouraging ADR and the
arguments of commentators like Havighurst and Metzloff. See Havighurst & Metzloff, supra note 76.
81. Experts in mediation and negotiation relate that the key to overcoming potential disputes is to
emphasize mutual interests and minimize the importance of rights. They restructure disputes and demon-
strate to the parties that concerted effort rather than conflict is the best means for reaching goals. For
instance, ADR techniques have helped overcome crippling labor strife in coal mines by showing both
workers and mine operators that decentralization, cooperation in decision-making, and greater flexibility
in work patterns are advantageous to both sides. WILLIAM L. URY ET AL., GETTING DISPUTES RESOLVED
101-33 (1988).
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generally mean arbitration or mediation when they refer to ADR.82 There
have been a large number of experiments with both arbitration and mediation
in medical malpractice disputes. For example, since 1965 Michigan has had
a voluntary and binding arbitration program for all claims concerning medical
injury. 3 The program passed constitutional challenge and has been considered
a prototype for arbitration. 4 Maryland also has offered mandatory, but non-
binding, arbitration. 5 Wisconsin created a mandatory mediation panel system
in 1986.6
Unfortunately, any impact these programs generated seems largely nega-
tive. For instance, in Michigan only 800 of 20,000 claims have been arbitrat-
ed. 87 In Maryland, more than half of the arbitrated cases eventually culminate
in litigation. 8 And in Wisconsin, the mediation process is perceived as gener-
ally inhibiting negotiation.89
One could argue that the practical problems associated with ADR are the
fault of professionals, especially lawyers, who have little to gain, and therefore
introduce more formal litigation procedures and techniques into the ADR
proceedings. They also recommend that clients forgo ADR, and emphasize
civil litigation. The remedy for such disruption is to force malpractice disputes
out of courts and into alternative fora through binding or mandatory ADR. Of
course many-judges in particular-oppose mandatory ADR; indeed courts
82. Ury and colleagues define mediation as "negotiation assisted by a third party." Id. at 49. The
mediation generally involves either a peer or an expert as the mediator. On the other hand, arbitration is
referred to as private adjudication. In arbitration as in the court room, the parties continue to present
evidence to a third party. Id. at 56. A hybrid between mediation and arbitration is referred to as med-arb
in which the mediator can become the arbitrator if the mediation does not succeed. Id. at 56-57.
Pre-trial screening panels are also classified as a form of alternative dispute resolution. These have
been widely criticized as costly and inefficient. See Martin H. Redish, Legislative Response to the Medical
Malpractice Insurance Crisis: Constitutional Challenges, 55 TEX. L. REV. 759, 766-68 (1977); James A.
Henderson, Agreements Changing the Forum for Resolving Malpractice Claims, 49 LAW & CoNTEMP.
PROBS., Spring 1986, at 243, 249. Nonetheless there are still advocates. E.g., Jean A. Macchiaroli, Medical
Malpractice Screening Panels: Proposed Model Legislation to Cure Judicial Ills, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
181, 187 (1990); see also Debra L. Fortenberry, Note, Screening Panels: Corrective Surgery or Amputa-
tion?, 4 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 255, 257 (1989); Shmanske & Stevens, supra note 49.
83. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: FEW CLAIMS RESOLVED THROUGH
MICIGAN'S VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION PROGRAM, (1991); Mary Bedikian, MedicalMalpracticeArbitration
Act: Michigan's Experience with Arbitration, 10 AM. J.L. & MED. 287 (1984).
84. See Morris v. Metriyakool, 344 N.W.2d 736, 755 (Mich. 1984). This was not true for mandatory,
non-binding arbitration in Pennsylvania; the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared the arbitration panels
to be unconstitutional delays of the right to a speedy jury trial. See Mattos v. Thompson, 421 A.2d 190,
195 (Penn. 1980). See also Stuart A. Law, Comment, After Mattos v. Thompson-The Future of
Pennsylvania's Health Services Malpractice Act, 86 DICK. L. REV. 313 (1981).
85. See James K. MacAlister & Alfred L. Scanlan, Health Claims Arbitration in Maryland: The
Experiment Has Failed, 14 U. BALT. L. REV. 481 (1985).
86. See Meschievitz, supra note 75, at 201-05.
87. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 83, at 3-10.
88. See MacAllister & Scanlon, supra note 85, at 501-03.
89. See Meschievitz, supra note 75, at 210-14.
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have found mandatory, binding agreements to be unconstitutional.9 While
wholesale efforts to endorse ADR techniques would increase their use, courts
generally fear that patients could not understand the nature and magnitude of
the rights they would be forfeiting in ex ante agreements.9
The alternative dispute resolution proposals appear rather neutral from
other perspectives for judging health policy reform. They may contain costs
by decreasing administrative costs associated with litigation, but as we have
seen, this effect is likely to be small so long as ADR remains underutilized.
ADR neither alters access to medical care, nor logically complements a
universal access financing proposal. Nor is ADR definitively more just than
tort reform: it does not offer any grounds for more appropriately compensating
those injured by medical accidents.
V. RADICAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND MULTIPLE STANDARDS OF CARE
Not to be dissuaded by judicial hesitance, or by states' unsuccessful
experiences with nonbinding or voluntary systems, Senator Domenici has now
submitted S. 1232, entitled "The Medical Injury Compensation Fairness Act
of 1991."92 This bill would require any malpractice cases arising from feder-
ally subsidized care to go into the alternative dispute resolution systems. Senate
Bill 1232 goes well beyond encouraging ADR and attempts to replace tort
law's inflexible emphasis on a single standard of care with a contractual
relationship between doctors and patients that would specify both the dispute
resolution forum and the standard of care that the patient had decided to
purchase. The defining paradigm is not a single standard expected of the
reasonable medical practitioner defined by physicians, but rather the purchase
90. The most frequently cited cases on courts' reactions to mandatory, binding arbitration are Tunkl
v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963) and Emoty Univ. v. Porubiansky, 282 S.E.2d. 903
(Ga. 1981).
91. See WEILER, supra note 40, at 94-95.
92. See Havighurst & Metzloff, supra note 76, at 179-83. S. 1232 creates three categories of patients
and providers: those whose care is paid for directly by the federal government; those whose health
insurance is a tax deductible business expense for an employer; and all others. Id. at 181. Anyone who
falls into the first two categories is assumed to have agreed to participate in dispute resolution programs.
In effect, then, ADR is binding and mandatory. All dispute resolution services must be certified by
the Secretary of Health and Human Services. The bill endorses the same sorts of limits on recoveries as
other federal bills, but notably does not specify the nature of the dispute resolution mechanisms to be
employed. Rather it appears to create a market place of different alternative dispute resolution techniques
with competition eventually leading to an appropriate mix of approaches.
As such, S. 1232 represents the most practical effort to effectuate theories of contractual relationships
that have long been advocated by Epstein and Havighurst. See Richard A. Epstein, Medical Malpractice,
Imperfect Information, and the Contractual Foundation for Medical Services, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Spring 1986, at 201; Clark C. Havighurst, Altering the Applicable Standard of Care, 49 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Spring 1986, at 265; Clark C. Havighurst, The Professional Paradigm of Medical Care: Obstacle
to Decentralization. 30 JURIMETRICS J. 415 (1990).
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of a particular standard by a well-informed consumer who also decides how
any disputes regarding failure to reach that standard are to be resolved. Senate
Bill 1232 does not just endorse arbitration; it presents an alternative method
for bringing about quality that deserves more thorough investigation.
The goal of S. 1232 is to create a market in health-care delivery that
features not only differently priced products (a result that is slowly being
accomplished by the competition between traditional insurance and managed
care options), but also products of various quality. Instead of the single
standard expected of the reasonable medical practitioner, the bill envisions
individual consumers, as well as benefits managers, selecting the level of care
they desire and purchasing an appropriate plan. Just as some people purchase
very safe Volvos, some people would purchase the reasonable standard of care.
Others buy Volkswagens, preferring lower price to safety; the same might be
true of some health-care purchasers.93
If there is merit in the multiple standard approach, its supporters must be
prepared to move away from theoretical formulations and describe a new
health-care market in detail. Specifically, they must address the process
questions that will arise.94 Two such questions seem paramount. One involves
the specification of the product, and the other concerns the distinction between
provider competence and choice of treatment.
First, it is difficult to envision how a real market might develop a compre-
hensive set of health-care standards. Advocates appear to intend every type
of disorder to have a hierarchy of therapies, each of which would have to be
specified in some detail. Developing such standards would be a mind-boggling
task.95 The specifications of therapy alternatives would also have to address
93. Perhaps the most interesting thing about the idea of multiple standards of care is that it is offered
as a response to our current crisis of un- and underinsurance. John Siliciano has provided the best
theoretical justification for multiple standards. See John A. Siliciano, Wealth, Equity, and the Unitary
Medical Malpractice Standard, 77 VA. L. REV. 439 (1991). He bases his attack on the unitary medical
standard by pointing out the inconsistency of having multiple standards in product liability law and a single
standard in health care. But his major rationale for development of diverse quality products in medical care
is a concern for those who lack access. The unitary standard, he reasons, has caused medical care to be
so expensive that many are simply priced out of the market. The humane thing to do is not to market only
Volvos, and leave some people without transportation, but rather to market some VW's for the less affluent.
I discuss this argument in more detail elsewhere. See Troyen A. Brennan, Why Increase Access to Medical
Care?, 29 Hous. L. REV. (forthcoming 1992).
94. Siliciano, for example, recognizes that process concerns, regarding the functioning of a liability
rule within the process of litigation, can justify certain rules that lack instrumental value. Siliciano, supra
note 93, at 473. In particular, he allows that the duty to rescue rule is justified as a result of process
constraints. For a discussion of process constraints in torts law, see James A. Henderson, Process
Constraints in Tons, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 901 (1982); see also James A. Henderson, Judicial Review of
Manufacturers Conscious Design Choices, Limits of the Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 531 (1973).
This segment of Siliciano's argument is critical. If he cannot overcome concerns about the process role
of the unitary standard, there is no need to debate the more complicated, and perhaps, more important
instrumental issues that support the unitary standard.
95. Presumably, these contracts would have to contain a great deal more detail on treatment options
than are presently available in practice guidelines. See infra text accompanying notes 99-104.
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the nuances in the presentations of the disease. For example, no two cases of
head trauma are alike, making rigid protocols difficult to apply. Consumers
could take advantage of any grey areas not clearly addressed by the protocol
to argue the standard was not met. Thus, although specification is critical, it
is difficult to attain.
Second, a provider's competence is not readily differentiated from the
selection of procedures: a competent doctor selects the correct therapy. If
competence itself is judged with a unitary standard, then why would a provider
take a chance on not employing more sophisticated therapy for a given case?
Suppose, for example, that the health-care product could be so carefully
specified that providers knew that skull injuries involving only brief loss of
consciousness were not to receive CT scans, but that those with injuries
causing prolonged loss of consciousness or neurological deficit were to go to
CT scan. If the CT scan were not done, and the patient were to die of a
subdural hematoma that would have been diagnosed if the test were completed,
then the estate of the patient might claim that the physician was incompetent
for failing to realize the loss of consciousness was prolonged, or for failing
to diagnose the neurological defect. The signal doctors would then receive
would be to ignore the empirical evidence of appropriate diagnostic interven-
tions. The unitary standard for competence would frustrate the goal of multiple
standards for allocation. It would be in the provider's interest simply to
perform the test.96
Even if specification were accomplished and physician behavior controlled,
courts would find it difficult to enforce the various standards. We have shown
that questions of negligence are extraordinarily complicated and account for
a large proportion of the administrative costs associated with litigation.97 With
multiple standards, the complexity of negligence determinations could only
increase, as would their cost. Plaintiffs' attorneys might find sufficient confu-
sion in cases where the standard is lower than the traditional "reasonable
practitioner" standard, and sufficiently high administrative costs, that it would
not be worthwhile to represent such cases. Since the "less than standard care"
96. This is true unless of course the provider faces serious negative financial incentives for performing
tests that are retrospectively identified as inappropriate. See Alan L. Hillman et al., How do Financial
Incentives Affect Physicians' Clinical Decisions in the Financial Performance of Health Maintenance
Organizations?, 321 NEW ENG. J. MED. 86 (1989). See also Mark Hall, Institutional Control of Physician
Behavior: Legal Barriers to Health Care Cost Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 431, 460-65 (1988)
(detailing the nature of positive and negative financial inducements in health maintenance organizations).
Congress has chosen to regulate such negative financial incentives under Medicare. See 42 U.S.C. §
1395(n) (1988). See also Siliciano, supra note 93, at 481.
97. See Brennan, Reliability and Validity, supra note 9. This study shows that determinations of
causation, where medical management as opposed to the disease process caused an injury, are relatively
uncomplicated. If one reviewer finds causation, then it is likely the next reviewer will. On the other hand,
negligence determinations lack this sort of inter-rater reliability. There are many cases in which physicians
disagree diametrically on the negligence standard. Hence, the judgments themselves must be regarded as
more complicated, and requiring higher costs to accomplish.
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cases would be more costly to represent, as a result of the unfamiliar standard,
and the economic damages would presumably be lower, we might find greater
diminution in the already diminished ability of lower-income patients to press
malpractice claims."
Clark Havighurst recognizes these process concerns about multiple stan-
dards, but thinks that he may have found the solution: practice guidelines."
Practice guidelines are standardized specifications for care, either for using
procedures or for managing a particular clinical problem.' °° Congress has
instructed the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research to develop guide-
lines, and this work is being undertaken by a variety of Patient Outcome
Research Teams (PORT's). A number of private organizations have already
developed guidelines.
Havighurst believes guidelines could overcome the type of process concerns
noted above. As others have argued, 1 practice guidelines could improve
the tort process by providing independent and impartial exculpatory or inculpa-
tory evidence about the standard of care. The guidelines, then, would increase
the validity and reliability of negligence determinations. The litigation process
would improve because the determination of fault would become less complex
if there were reference guidelines. The administrative costs would also de-
crease.
The same could be true for torts in a multiple-standard world. Presumably,
practice guidelines could be developed for each of the various standards for
a given condition. Hence, there would be not only a "usual practice" standard
for coronary artery disease and use of angiography, but also a "far-below-
usual" practice standard, and a "moderately-below-usual" practice standard.
The algorithms, then, would solve the process problems faced by courts and
attorneys as they confront the welter of levels of care.
Havighurst also draws the use of guidelines back into the ADR movement.
He envisions use of practice parameters and multiple standards within media-
tion or arbitration. First, the market would develop a series of different
98. We have recently shown that patients with lower incomes are less likely to sue than are other
patients, even when the degree of medical injury is controlled for in the analysis. See Burstin et al., supra
note 67. Hence, the complexity introduced by the market in quality products might have the reverse effect
intended by Siciliano, for example, as poor patients, no longer protected by the deterrence effect of
malpractice, would be subject to still higher rates of substandard care. See Brennan, supra note 93.
99. See Clark C. Havighurst, Practice Guidelines as Legal Standards Governing Physician Liability,
54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1991, at 87.
100. See Troyen A. Brennan, Practice Guidelines and Malpractice Litigation: Collision or Cohesion,
16 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 67 (1991). See also Lucian L. Leape, Practice Guidelines and Standards,
16 QUALITY REV. BULL. 42 (1990); John T. Kelly & James E. Swartout, Commentary, Development of
Practice Parameters by Physician's Organizations, 16 QUALITY REV. BULL. 54 (1990).
101. See Eleanor D. Kinney & Marilyn M. Wilder, Medical Standard Setting in the Current Malprac-
tice Environment, 22 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 421 (1989); Mark Hall, The Defense of Effective Medical
Practice Policies and Malpractice Litigation, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1991, at 119. Neither
of these articles discusses the use of practice guidelines as part of a multiple standards reform.
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approaches. Patients then would select the method of dispute resolution and
the standard to be employed by the treating physicians. Guidelines not only
would allow patients to identify the standards they want (some might desire
blue-ribbon care for heart disease, but bargain-basement for kidney problems),
but also would ease the adjudication of disputes. Thus, they would play the
specification role necessary for multiple standards to work.
This vision is comprehensive, 0 2 but it seriously overstates the merits of
practice guidelines. While they undoubtedly will play some role in traditional
litigation in the near future, the overall impact of algorithms or guidelines is
likely to remain small simply because they are vague and apply to few clinical
situations that give rise to injuries.0 3 Additionally, guidelines are primarily
designed to address issues of appropriateness, not general quality matters."°
Thus, they infrequently specify the entire standard of care expected in a given
case. Estimates are that less than 20% of medical injuries would be addressed
by existing parameters.' 5 It seems unreasonable to those who have reviewed
claims files that algorithms will ever be so well and broadly developed that
they will prove dispositive in more than a handful of situations. The guideline
concept, therefore, seems an unconvincing approach to solve the process
problems that exist in the unitary standard world, let alone the multiple stan-
dard one."
It appears, then, that proposals for moving away from the unitary, profes-
sion-specified standard are unlikely to gain much headway, even if one restricts
the critique to efficient process concerns. The more steadfast opposition,
102. Havighurst's proposal is also comprehensive in that it addresses not only quality, but also access,
cost containment and justice. His argument, like Siliciano's, is that a market with cheap products will
increase access. He also believes competition will decrease the cost of medical care. Finally, the market,
in this vision, provides the greatest procedural justice.
103. See Arnold M. Epstein, The Outcomes Movement-Will It Get Us Where We Want to Go?, 323
NEW ENG. J. MED. 266, 268-69 (1990).
104. Appropriateness must be considered a subset of the general quality issues. Consider the following
example: a physician decides to recommend that a patient undergo coronary angiography. The patient has
been having some atypical chest pains, not associated with exertion. The patient has no cardiac risk factors.
The physician proceeds to perform the angiography which is done in an expert fashion. No significant
coronary artery disease is found. The procedure would not be appropriate if the proper indications for
undertaking this procedure were lacking. The guidelines movement is intended to provide insurers and
physicians with a crisp sets of indications for procedures. On the other hand, the performance of the
procedure itself met the standard expected of the reasonable medical practitioner. Hence, it would be
unlikely to give rise to medical malpractice litigation. See Brennan, supra note 100, at 70-74.
105. See Deborah W. Garnick et al., Can Practice Guidelines Reduce the Number and Costs of
Malpractice Claims?, 266 JAMA 2856, 2858 (1991).
106. Another process problem is that physician behavior may in many ways frustrate the intent of the
multiple standard approach. For example, what if a doctor had a patient who she thought needed an MRI
scan to make the diagnosis of multiple sclerosis? Assume also that this patient's health insurance does not
pay for an MRI scan. The doctor might find it an ethical duty to try to cheat the system by getting this
patient the MRI scan. She could go to the doctor who supervises the MRI scans in her hospital and beg
him to do an MRI scan without charging the patient. This kind of cheating could become rampant.
Moreover, it is difficult to understand how even stringent financial penalties could control such behavior.
This type of concern is not addressed by Siliciano or Havighurst.
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however, will most likely come from those affronted by the ethical implications
of having various levels of care. Siliciano, I°  and occasionally
Havighurst, t0 8 allude to the symbolic importance of the single standard of
care, but discuss it little. If multiple-standard proposals ever gain momentum,
many will step forward to oppose what they see as efforts to confine the poor
to second- or third-class medical care. While Havighurst offers humane reasons
for the proposals, others will see just the opposite."' 9 Politicians are not
likely to find second-class care proposals palatable.
In summary, radical notions of mandatory, binding ADR that entail the use
of multiple standards of care, like S. 1232, are not intellectually or politically
viable at this point. Encouragement of voluntary or nonbinding ADR tech-
niques will likely continue, but history suggests they will have little impact on
dispute resolution. Most lawyers, as well as their clients, will continue to favor
traditional malpractice litigation.
VI. ADMINISTRATIVE ALTERNATIVE TO TORTS: THE AMA PROPOSAL
Having rejected traditional tort reform, and having suggested that more
radical market-based approaches that entail mandatory ADR methods would
be impractical, I now turn to two administrative approaches to medical injury
compensation and deterrence that have not yet been formulated as congressio-
nal proposals: the American Medical Association's Administrative Tribunal
and a no-fault patient compensation model proposed by Professor Paul Weiler
of Harvard Law School.10 These reforms share a commitment to administra-
tive claims processing that is independent of the common law courts. In that
sense, they represent more radical reform than simple encouragement of
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. On the other hand, both retain
unitary standards for judging the competence of medical practitioners. In most
other ways, however, the AMA and Weiler models are dissimilar.
107. Siliciano provides a long and sympathetic discussion of the instrumental value of the unitary
standard. See Siliciano, supra note 93, at 459-68. He ends up rejecting it because of the access implications.
If access issues were addressed by payer reform, much of the instrumental value of the unitary standard
would be restored.
108. See Clark C. Havighurst, Practice Guidelines for Medical Care: The Policy Rationale, 34 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 777, 790 (1990).
109. Concerns about second-class care have been raised by opponents of the Oregon Medicaid
rationing plan. See Peter Budetti, Medicaid Rationing in Oregon: Political Wolf in Sheep's Clothing, 2
HEALTH MATRIX 205 (1991); see also, Max Mehlman, The Oregon Medicaid Program: Is It Just?, 2
HEALTH MATRIX 175 (1991).
110. In this discussion, I rely on the AMA/SPECIALTY SOCIETY MEDICAL LIABILITY PROJECT, A
PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE TO THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM FOR RESOLVING MEDICAL LIABILITY DISPUTES:
A FAULT-BASED ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM (1987) [hereinafter A PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE]. For Weiler's
work I rely in general on WEILER, supra note 40, at 114-58. While my views and those of Weiler diverge
somewhat, we are in general agreement about the relative benefits of a strict liability/no-fault proposal.
See Weiler & Brennan, supra note 40, at 54-55.
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The American Medical Association's administrative fault-based system is
meant to overcome what the AMA sees as the main problems with tort litiga-
tion. These are: (1) the inability of many victims of medical negligence to gain
access to attorneys, largely because their claims will not result in substantial
awards; and (2) the inappropriate and ineffective use of juries as a way to
resolve complicated medical disputes. In addition, the proposal seems to be
based on the perception that massive jury awards are threatening the afford-
ability of liability insurance; this is somewhat paradoxical given the above
concern about victims' lack of access to courts.
In place of tort litigation, the AMA would create a State Medical Board.
The Board would function as part of the state government, with its leadership
appointed by the governor. By submitting a relatively simple form, patients
could have their medical care reviewed by claims adjustors hired by the state.
Claims with merit would undergo a second evaluation by a medical specialist
hired by the Board. The expert would assist the claimant in evaluating the
claim and any settlement offered by defendants. Before moving to a hearing,
blind settlement offers by both parties would be required.
If there is no settlement the Board's general counsel would provide an
attorney for the patient. A hearing examiner would supervise discovery on an
expedited basis and evaluate the expert testimony that both parties would bring
to a hearing. At the hearing, the examiner would be allowed to bring indepen-
dent expertise to bear. Within ninety days, the examiner would issue a written
opinion regarding liability. The Medical Board would act as an appellate
review panel. The review would consist of a full independent determination
of the claim. Appeal from the Medical Board's decision could be made to an
intermediate appellate court within the state, but the standard for review would
be the usual standard for judicial review of administrative proceedings: the
court could overturn only those decisions found to be arbitrary and capri-
cious. 1 1
Unlike Paul Weiler's proposal discussed below, the AMA's liability plan
retains fault as the basis for liability. It provides a specific definition of
reasonableness: that of a prudent and competent practitioner." 2 The new plan
also endorses proportionate liability, caps on noneconomic damages, economic
damages that reflect realistic market replacement costs, several rather than joint
and several liability, and periodic payments for awards greater than
$100,000.113
The Medical Board not only would review determinations at hearings, but
111. For more details on the functioning of the panel see A PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE, supra note 110,
at 19-34. See also Kirk Johnson et al., A Fault-Based Administrative Alternative for Resolving Medical
Malpractice Claims, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1365 (1989).
112. See A PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE, supra note 110, at 94.
113. id. at 135-48. Most of these reforms are quite similar to the tort-reform proposals endorsed by
the variety of congressional bills discussed above. See supra text accompanying notes 54-57.
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also would be integrated into the credentialing and disciplinary functions of
existing state licensing boards. In addition, the Medical Board would act as
a clearinghouse for all information on individual providers, including disciplin-
ary actions taken by hospitals and by other states. The Medical Board would
thoroughly review all such actions and compile complete records of violations
reported about physicians.
A great deal of ink has been spilled regarding the constitutionality of the
AMA's proposal." 4 It is difficult to predict exactly how the AMA's proposal
would withstand constitutional challenge. Indeed, the outcome will likely turn
on the specific measures enacted by each individual state that embraces the
AMA approach.
The three major benefits that are touted on behalf of the AMA's adminis-
trative fault-based proposal conform to the AMA's perception of the drawbacks
of conventional tort litigation. The first is that claims will be resolved more
fairly because they are brought before expert panels. It is often stated that lay
juries are incapable of addressing the complex issues that arise in litigation of
scientific matters, including medical malpractice.' This is a substantial
reason for the AMA's proposal; its supporters note time and again the theoreti-
cal inappropriateness of allowing non-experts to judge the behavior of highly
trained specialists." 6 They argue that a jury decision is no better than a
lottery, and that an expert panel would restore predictability to medical dis-
putes.
This opinion, however, ignores much of the empirical literature on the
effect of having lay juries assess medical malpractice claims. In malpractice
law, the majority of cases settle before trial. Among the cases that do go to
trial, the variation in jury awards is great, but much of the variation can be
attributed to differences in the severity of the injury." 7 Moreover, the varia-
tion in jury awards is less than in cases settled by insurers, who presumably
rely on experts.""
Thomas Metzloff's thorough review of jury decisions in malpractice cases
114. See, e.g., WEILER, supra note 40, at 117; Hugh E. Reynolds et al., A Constitutional Analysis
of the American Medical Association's Medical Liability Project Proposal, 1 Crs. HEALTH Scl. & L. 58
(1990).
115. See Elliot M. Abramson, The Medical Malpractice in Imbroglio: A Non-Adversarial Suggestion,
78 KY. L.J. 293, 295 (1989-1990); M. Leroy Schwarz, Liability Crisis: The Physician's Viewpoint, in
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE-TORT REFORM 24 (James E. Hammer & B.R. Jennings eds., 1987).
116. See Johnson et al., supra note 111, at 1375.
117. E.g., Randall Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling 'Pain and Suffering,
83 Nw. U. L. REV. 908, 919-24 (1989) [hereinafter Bovbjerg, Scheduling Pain and Suffering]. Randall
Bovjberg et al. suggest that the sympathy of jurors for the particular injury and resulting disability of a
plaintiff may play an important role in explaining the variation in the amount of damages between
malpractice suits and other types of tort cases. See Randall Bovbjerg et al., Juries and Justice: Are
Malpractice and Other Personal Injuries Created Equal?, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROS., Winter 1991,
at 5.
118. See Frank Sloan & L.C. Hsieh, Variability in Malpractice Payment: Is Compensation Fair?, 24
LAW & Soc'y REV. 997 (1990).
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reveals that juries usually decide the way that insurers would predict when it
comes to assessing liability, and any uncertainty is the result of differences in
damages for similar injury cases." 9 These studies imply that the problem
with the jury system is not in the understanding of scientific evidence of
medical injury and negligence, but rather in the understanding of the conse-
quences of injury. Hence, Bovbjerg, Sloan and Blumstein recommend imple-
menting a schedule of damages for non-monetary losses. 2 ' Although none
of these studies suggest that an expert panel would do a worse job than would
juries, replacement of juries should not be considered a sufficient reason to
support reform as radical as that proposed by the AMA.
The second major rationalization for the AMA's proposal is that it will be
more expedient and less costly. Malpractice litigation is very expensive, with
administrative costs that are now thought to exceed 50%. I ' Furthermore,
on average it takes over three years before there is any payment on a
claim.' 22 Still, this does not mean that an administrative scheme will resolve
cases more quickly. In particular, earlier studies of screening panels similar
to the AMA's Board have suggested that massive delays are common. 23
Therefore, we can expect a significant amount of non-compliance with the 90-
day disposition rule supported by the AMA.
The notion that the administrative fault method will be less costly also has
little support. If administrative costs are directly related to the nature of the
decision that must be made, it follows that the administrative fault-based
system has an inconsequential theoretical advantage over the common law
fault-based system. Both must address the complex problems of causation (did
medical management cause the injury?) as well as negligence (was the standard
of care met?). Insofar as the latter is more complicated and therefore more
costly, retaining it within the AMA program suggests that the expenditures on
administration may be quite similar to those of the present tort system.
The questions of cost and funding are critical to the AMA's proposal. The
AMA endorses the establishment of a public agency, supported by state
revenues. The speed, and in many ways the fairness, of the system will be
dependent on adequate funds to support the investigators and court-appointed
lawyers. The program removes the plaintiff's attorney, motivated by a contin-
gency fee, from the scene. Hence, medical liability would rely, more than
ever, on the government.
This reliance on government is troubling. As state budgets across the
country shrink, one can support only anxiously a program that could easily
119. Thomas B. Metzloff, Resolving Malpractice Disputes: hnaging the Jury's Shadow, 54 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1991, at 43, 82-86 (1991).
120. Bovjberg, Scheduling Pain and Suffering, supra note 117, at 975.
121. See WEILER, supra note 40, at 53.
122. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 1984 CLOSED CLAIS SURVEY 32-35 (1987).
123. See Shmanske & Stevens, supra note 49.
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become a target of budget cutting. Massachusetts is a telling example of the
kind of disasters that can occur. After the legislature passed a sweeping set
of laws in the mid-1980s, when the state was in the midst of the Dukakis
miracle, it appeared that the state Board of Registration in Medicine would
begin to undertake comprehensive oversight of doctors and hospitals. Instead,
after a new Republican administration's budget cuts, the Board is woefully
understaffed, and cannot begin to address the flood of information supplied by
providers under the 1986 law. 124 Similar circumstances could occur in states
which replace malpractice litigation with the AMA administrative proposal;
if the state Medical Board is unable to fulfill its duty, both the compensation
and deterrence function of tort law would be compromised.
The third supposed advantage of the AMA proposal is the greater deter-
rence it will bring about, as a result of the lower barriers to claims. An injured
plaintiff must file a simple form to initiate a claim, and can then expect state
assistance in processing and prosecuting the case. Of course, if this process
is not adequately funded, the wait for appropriate representation could be quite
long. Perhaps some delays could be tolerated if the AMA proposal induced
more claims and greater deterrence. One must weigh, however, the benefits
of a simplified process and public representation against the loss of a plaintiffs
attorney motivated to perform well by economic gain. Furthermore, the
proposal incorporates a series of tort reforms that have been shown to decrease
claiming. Therefore, the predicted increase in claiming, and hence deterrence,
might not occur.
Given these arguments, one cannot endorse the AMA fault-based proposal
with enthusiasm. Its theoretical benefits are limited. Although an experiment
might answer some empirical questions and demonstrate the efficacy of
administrative fault, a complete shift in even one state would be ill advised.
VII. ADMINISTRATIVE ALTERNATIVES TO TORTS: NO-FAULT
No-fault administrative compensation systems have long been advocated
as a more rational method for compensating and deterring injuries from
accidents. " Generally, no-fault removes consideration of negligence from
the determination of compensation (and so in many ways is equivalent to strict
liability). An injured individual need only show causation and injury. No-fault
compensation for medical injuries is the norm in several countries, most
notably Sweden and New Zealand.
124. See Saltus, supra note 23.
125. See, e.g., Jeffrey O'Connell, No-Fault Insurance for Injuries Arising from Medical Treatment:
A Proposal for Elective Coverage, 24 EMORY L.J. 21 (1975); Charles H. Montange, Note, Comparative
Approaches to Liability for Medical Maloccurrences, 84 YALE L.J. 1141 (1975).
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In the United States, no-fault compensation has long been ruled out because
of its presumed cost. For example, our research revealed that in 1984 there
were 27,000 negligent medical injuries in New York, all of which could have
given rise to successful tort claims. In addition, there were another 61,000
non-negligent injuries that would have been compensated by a no-fault system.
Meanwhile, there were only 3,600 malpractice claims. To resolve only these
claims, providers (hospitals and physicians) paid approximately $1.2 billion
in premiums to professional liability insurers. Thus, moving to no-fault may
appear to be impossible economically.
There are, however, some reasons to believe an administrative no-fault
program would not be as expensive as the above figures suggest. First, as
noted, administrative costs of tort law now exceed 50% of premiums paid. It
is doubtful that a no-fault compensation scheme for medical injury would
experience such high costs. Indeed, the best-known analogy, worker's compen-
sation, produces administrative expenses of about 20% .126
The reasons for this efficiency go beyond those offered by advocates of
the AMA fault-based proposal. As previously mentioned, making causal and
attributive judgments about medical injuries is relatively simple and inexpen-
sive.1 27 Negligence determinations, on the other hand, are quite difficult and
unreliable and, therefore, absorb higher costs. The move to no-fault takes
advantage not only of the efficiencies of expert determination, but also of the
absence of the difficult negligence judgment. Second, more than 70% of
injuries resolve within six months and have relatively small costs. 128 It may
be that the present tort system is only compensating high-cost serious injuries.
The additional costs of paying for the small injuries are relatively small.
In light of these considerations, a group of colleagues and I recently
estimated the costs of a hypothetical no-fault plan for the state of New York
in 1984.129 We put the following conditions on the compensation system. We
required, as have many states, a mandatory collateral source offset. This is
equitable from a compensation viewpoint, although it might lessen the deter-
rence effect. We also assumed that first- or second-party health insurers would
continue to occupy a prior position to the compensation fund. We then estimat-
ed payments only for the costs of injuries caused by medical management.
To do this analysis, each subgroup of the population (workers, retirees,
homemakers, and children) required slightly different survey methods. Com-
bining the amounts for all, discounting appropriately, incorporating the above-
noted assumptions, and then developing present value figures for 1989 dollars,
126. See George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modem Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521,
1560 (1987).
127. See Brennan, Empirical Analysis of Accidents, supra note 9, text accompanying notes 56-57.
128. Id.
129. See Johnson et al., supra note 9.
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we estimated the overall costs of the hypothetical no-fault plan to be $1.024
billion dollars. Lost wages and losses of household production represent more
than 70% of this total.
The final sum is considerably less than the approximately $1.2 billion now
being spent in New York State for medical liability insurance."' 0 This esti-
mate demonstrates that a no-fault program for medical injury, as outlined,
could be an affordable alternative to tort litigation. Of course, there are several
caveats. First, we are comparing the estimates of compensable losses suffered
by patients injured in 1984 to malpractice costs estimated by insurers for
patients injured in 1988. This is a reasonable comparison, however, if one
assumes injury rates are stable.' 3' This estimate also does not include admin-
istrative costs, which would add more than 20% to the total costs. 32 Finally,
we have not included compensation for pain and suffering.'33
In making this estimate we did not specify the no-fault plan in any detail.
130. The total expenditures on malpractice were devised as follows. For 1988, the latest year for which
figures were available, the New York State Department of Insurance reported that doctors and hospitals
paid approximately $850 million in direct malpractice premiums. Our analysis of data for 1984 indicated
that an additional 40-50% over and above direct premiums was spent by various health-care organizations
on self-insurance. See HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY, PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND LAWYERS:
MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION IN NEW YORK ch. 8, at 79
n.44 (1990).
131. Our estimates for New York in 1984 were similar to those calculated in a similar study in
California in 1975. See Don H. Mills, Medical Insurance Feasibility Study: A Technical Summary, W. J.
MED. 360 (1978).
132. At this time, we are actively pursuing research in Sweden and New Zealand in an effort to
understand administrative costs associated with their no-fault programs. This will allow us to develop a
more accurate estimate of the total costs of the no-fault alternatives.
The administration of the Swedish system is instructive. If a patient thinks there has been an injury
as a result of medical care, application for benefits from the Patient Fund is made using forms available
in all clinics and in all hospitals. It is quite common for physicians to encourage patients to file and to help
patients fill out the forms. The percentage of claims filed with physician participation probably ranges
somewhere between 70-90%. Patients are also assisted throughout the process by a social worker from
the hospital. After the initial claim, a physician must write a report concerning the injury.
The reports and patient claims are then transmitted to a central office in Stockholm, where an adjustor
registers the complaint and communicates with the patient. The claims adjustor is charged with the initial
management of the claim and develops a file that includes the claim, the patient statement, the physician's
report and the medical records. Following initial determination of eligibility, the adjustor will contact one
of the many doctors who work part or full time for the patient insurance consortium, including a variety
of specialists. The fund-employed physicians and claim managers apply specific criteria for eligibility and
make a final determination. See Marilynn M. Rosenthal & Troyen A. Brennan, Swedish Patient Injury
Compensation: Adaptation to the United States (November 11, 1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the Yale Law & Policy Review).
133. A method for scheduling pain and suffering has been offered in Bovbjerg, Scheduling Pain and
Suffering, supra note 117. We are preparing several estimates of pain and suffering using the methods they
have suggested.
To minimize costs, a fully developed American compensation scheme would have to limit decision-
makers' discretion by developing guidelines, in particular lists of classes of compensable events, which
would limit appeals from the determination of compensability. See Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Obstetrics
and Malpractice: Evidence on the Performance of a Selective No-Fault System, 265 JAMA 2836 (1991).
Scheduled damages would also decrease administrative discretion and presumably appeals. James F.
Blumstein et al., Beyond Tort Reform: Developing Better Toolsfor Assessing Damages for Personal Injury,
8 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 177-88 (1991).
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A mature system might function similarly to the system now existing in
Sweden. A patient who was medically injured would be assisted in filling out
a claims form by a social worker. An adjuster employed by the hospital's
liability insurer would review the claim. If it merited further attention, the
adjuster would confer with an insurance company physician, and they would
put together an offer for the patient that would be subect to approval by a
claims board at the company. If the patient did not find the offer acceptable,
she could appeal to an appeals board operated by the state. The appeals board
would be part of a Medical Injury Administration that would be much smaller
than that envisioned by the AMA's proposal. Further appeal could then be
made to an intermediate level state court, based on an "arbitrary and capri-
cious" standard.
No-fault would undoubtedly cost more than torts, 134 but it would compen-
sate many more people, removing the costs of negligent and non-negligent
injury from those who must now bear them. In this regard, the no-fault
compensation proposal and proposals for universal access to health care share
many of the same justice-based rationales. While the right to compensation
after an injury is quite distinct philosophically from a right to health care,
elaboration of an entitlement to care for illness and support for the costs of
accidents regardless of fault are both steps toward a more complete social
welfare safety net. Conversely, traditional tort reform increases the victims'
share of the costs of accidents and has little in common with the impulses to
help the uninsured bear the costs of ill health.
In addition to these philosophical similarities, no-fault also works well with
universal access because the two, in tandem, make the administrative no-fault
system more affordable. The overall and administrative costs would drop
significantly if the no-fault program did not have to deal with those individuals
whose adverse events result primarily in medical care costs.
The deterrence argument has long challenged those who advocate no-fault
compensation. In Sweden, for instance, fees paid by each citizen into a Pa-
tients' Fund underwrite the program. Therefore, claims brought against the
Fund do not create any economic penalties for providers, and there is no
economic deterrence.'35 This could be remedied if Sweden were willing to
move to enterprise liability, with individual hospitals paying experience-rated
134. Critics might point out that inflation would be a problem for an administrative compensation
scheme, as it has been for workers' compensation. See LESLIE 1. BODEN ET AL., WORKERS' COMPENSATION
RESEARCH INST., MEDICAL COST CONTAINMENT IN WORKERS' COMPENSATION: A NATIONAL INVENTORY,
1991-1992 (1992). Of course, much of the rise in workers' compensation insurance rates is due to medical-
care costs. If these were handled by a universal-access system that emphasizes cost containment, a medical
injury compensation plan looks more affordable.
135. The safety-diminishing effects of no-fault reform have been reviewed in 1 AMERICAN LAW INST.,
ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY: THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 351, 375, 397
(Reporters' Study, 1991).
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premiums based on their historic accident rate. 116 Indeed, this is the basis
for Paul Weiler's proposed no-fault medical injury system, in which the funds
for compensation would be generated through fees paid by hospitals to insur-
ers, who would then pay successful claims.'
In many ways, enterprise liability with experience rating is preferable to
existing methods of tort deterrence. Tort deterrence still emphasizes the
individual treating physician as the locus of responsibility for medical inju-
ries. 13 Yet the individual physician has few methods for addressing error
prevention systematically. He or she generally sees a suit as an aberration, an
event over which he or she has no control. The possibility of preventing the
suit is rarely part of any calculation made by a defendant provider.'39 Indeed,
this view is supported by a recent statistical analysis of malpractice claims
which suggests that accident avoidance strategies cannot be based on the
experience of individual practitioners. 4° A hospital, on the other hand, has
the necessary resources and appropriate experience with multiple claims to take
rational steps towards prevention. "1 Hospitals and their medical staffs have
long been charged with the responsibility of providing high-quality care to
patients. 142 Many hospitals have well-developed risk management systems,
at least some of which appear to decrease the rate of malpractice claims that
are filed against them.' 43 In addition, the comprehensive information on
medical injuries which would be available under a no-fault system could be
readily integrated into a "total quality management" (TQM) approach that
would emphasize organizational safety."'
136. Kip Viscusi has shown that this method of underwriting workers' compensation benefits has very
strong deterrence effects. See MICHAEL J. MOORE & W. KIP Viscusi, COMPENSATION MECHANISMS FOR
JOB RISKS: WAGES, WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND PRODUCT LIABILITY 151-160 (1990). The beauty of
experience-rating hospitals is that they have the aggregation of claims that can make the rating work
rationally. The same is not true of physicians, who are exposed to claims relatively infrequently, making
individual provider rating unattractive. See John E. Rolph et al., Malpractice Claims Data as a Quality
Improvement Tool: 11. Is Targeting Effective?, 266 JAMA 2093 (1991).
137. See WEILER, supra note 40, at 124-32.
138. See BRENNAN, supra note 2, at 133-36. In the past, physicians were the sole target of claims
as a result of the charitable immunity for hospitals and the relative immunity afforded to nurses by the
borrowed servant doctrine. See GEORGE ANNAS ET AL., AMERICAN HEALTH LAW 240-50 (1989).
139. As part of our comprehensive study of medical malpractice we conducted in-depth interviews
with over 100 physicians, half of whom had been sued. Critical analysis of these interviews reveals that
most physicians see themselves as analagous to unjustly charged suspects in a criminal proceeding. Their
main reactions to being sued are surprise and a sense of powerlessness. HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE
STUDY, supra note 130, ch. 9 at 58.
140. See Rolph et al., supra note 136.
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In view of the advantages of institutional liability, the law of malpractice
has slowly evolved to hold hospitals themselves responsible for injuries to
patients.145 In the past, common law doctrines such as charitable immunity and
fellow servant rules prohibited suits against hospitals and their employees.
Increasingly, however, courts are finding hospitals liable for injuries occurring
therein, independent of provider negligence. Enterprise liability merely acceler-
ates this process.
There are additional reasons why no-fault compensation is preferable to
tort law. Tort law's deterrent signal is designed only to bring about prevention
of negligent medical injuries, yet our research suggests- that a significant
number of medical injuries that physicians do not term negligent are nonethe-
less preventable. 1 ' The no-fault approach would capture all preventable
adverse outcomes, and presumably would create pressure to prevent some
adverse outcomes that tort law does not. For instance, hospitals would have
incentives to address drug treatment errors that are presently considered non-
negligent, yet are unintended and potentially preventable. Therefore, compen-
sation of non-negligent injuries could help to bring about their prevention,
whereas the present tort system brings no preventive effect to bear on such
injuries.
This broader, more rational compensation system is also arguably more
just than our present method of haphazard compensation. A greater number
of people would receive compensation for injuries, the costs of which they
would otherwise have to bear by themselves. Indeed, the no-fault system could
be designed to address chronic, severely debilitating injuries that presently go
uncompensated.
The no-fault compensation program also appears to have an advantage
over the AMA's fault-based system in that it does not require the development
of as large a bureaucracy. Many claims could be handled by insurance adjust-
ers, as is currently done with workers' compensation. Only those claims
involving significant disputes would be funneled into the public administrative
system. Moreover, since no-fault deterrence operates privately through experi-
ence-rated insurance premiums, the system would be less vulnerable to the
budget crises of state governments.
Admittedly, a hospital-based approach does have some troublesome fea-
tures. One daunting problem will be the need to shift funds from providers to
hospitals as part of the private, insurance-driven scheme. Since under this plan
the state will presumably be exonerating providers from liability for injuries
in hospitals, the providers' malpractice premiums should drop. On the other
145. Weiler discusses the development of expanded hospital liability in some detail. See WEILER, supra
note 40, at 177 n.23.
146. See Lucian L. Leape et a]., Preventability of Medical Injuries (Apr. 30, 1992) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Yale Law & Policy Review).
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hand, the strict liability system would create much larger premiums for hospi-
tals. It follows that physicians would have to pay an amount to hospitals equal
to the amount by which their own premiums had decreased. A voluntary
system for accomplishing these shifts seems unrealistic.
Another problem with a hospital-based approach is how to address injuries
that occur in the outpatient setting. If we simply graft hospital strict liability
onto existing common law, we would create incentives for hospitals to claim
that patients were harmed in the course of outpatient care, while doctors would
try to establish that all injuries were the responsibility of the hospital. Courts
would probably be hesitant to hold hospitals liable for outpatient injuries.'47
Both of these problems become more tractable if the introduction of a no-
fault program is integrated with universal access reforms. If we undertake
significant modifications in payment methods, we could make appropriate
proportionate changes in reimbursement levels so that both physicians and
hospitals are made whole under the new liability premiums: physicians would
be paid less and hospitals would be reimbursed at higher rates. It would be
possible for the system to cover outpatient injuries as well, especially if
physicians are linked to particular hospitals as part of global budgeting.
A link between universal access and no-fault medical injury compensation
would solve another major administrative problem. The single-payer system
now being considered in some states could be adapted to take into account
hospital experience-rated insurance premiums for medical injuries. Reimburse-
ment for hospitals, and their affiliated physicians, could be modified according
to their losses from compensation of injuries. The savings for lower injury
rates could be passed along to more careful hospitals and their staff. Determin-
ing the insurance premium paid by hospitals would be challenging and would
depend on a complicated mix of factors including severity of patient illness,
carefulness of providers, and income levels of injured patients. This task,
however, would not be beyond the capabilities of careful actuaries. For
advocates of no-fault medical insurance and universal access, the complementa-
ry nature of these reforms is especially attractive.
Of course, deterrence under a no-fault plan entails more thorough
organizational monitoring of physicians. Many observers of medical care have
suggested that such oversight and control of physician behavior is critical to
serious health-care reform. 4 ' The optimal behavior from both deterrence and
compensation viewpoints would be to have physicians report injuries to the
hospital administration. This information would be processed using epidemio-
logical techniques to identify risk factors for medical injuries, and would lead
147. See Pedroza v. Bryant, 677 P.2d 166 (Wash. 1984) (holding that hospital not liable for care
rendered patient in physician's private office).
148. See, e.g., Hall, supra note 96.
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to the creation of intervention strategies. Continuous interventions of this sort
could form a major part of a hospital's total quality management scheme.1 49
Of course, some may discount the possibility of physician participation in
this scheme, especially since the experience-rated insurance system would
impose economic sanctions on the hospitals with higher injury rates. Moreover,
doctors would have to accept the greater role of hospital administrators in.
quality assurance matters. 50 On the other hand, since the no-fault system
would remove a good deal of the finger-pointing that presently surrounds fault-
based litigation, doctors might be more enthusiastic about their participation
in the process. Indeed, we have already performed a real-life test of physician
self-reporting, with excellent results. 5'
VIII. CONCLUSION
This overview of quality assurance leads to several conclusions. Reviewing
the evidence of the incidence of medical injuries and the manner in which they
are compensated suggests that traditional tort reform, which decreases the
number of malpractice suits, is intellectually indefensible. Among the more
radical alternatives to tort law, a no-fault method of compensation for medical
injuries, linked to experience-rated institutional liability, holds the greatest
promise of significant improvement in our health-care system. This reform
could be most easily instituted if linked to changes in health-care funding that
emphasize universal access. While a no-fault compensation system would not
reduce overall costs, it would reduce spending on the administration of claims
and would distribute compensation for injuries to a much wider group of
patients. The system would not require a large bureaucracy constantly vulnera-
ble to budget cuts. Most importantly, such a system would force hospitals to
adopt a systemic approach to quality assurance, thus bringing about significant
improvement in the quality of care provided by the medical establishment.
149. See Troyen A. Brennan et al., Integrating Providers into Quality Improvement: A Pilot Project
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